Blog

Thursday 3 April 2026

Iran Plays Their Houthi Trump Card

Iran has decided to add additional asymmetric pressure by bringing the Houthis into the conflict with the United States. They launched missile attacks on Israel 3/28 and yesterday launched a coordinated attack on southern Israel with Hezbollah and Iran. One must surmise that Iranians delayed playing the Houthi card until they felt the time was right, and while they have denied participating in any negotiations with the United States, there has to be a reason for employing the Houthis now – they’re in negotiations with the United States and want to show they can bring pressure on Red Sea shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb.

The Houthis can bring pressure on Red Sea shipping, despite the truce they brokered with the United States in May of last year, especially since it excluded Israel. On Tuesday, President Trump told aides he was willing to end the combat operations against Iran even if the Strait of Hormuz remained largely closed. Today Trump claimed Iran asked for a cease-fire, which Iran has denied (which is no surprise, even if it’s true, which it probably isn’t). So, what is the current situation? It seems as if Trump is looking for the least painful way out of a situation that would not allow an exit without putting more American lives and materiel at risk. This is where the Iranians deftly employed the Houthis, adding an additional pain point that Trump didn’t envision would be a part of his quick decapitation campaign.

Monday 20 March 2026

CTF-152 where are you?

President Trump seems to have trouble making up his mind on whether or not the United States needs assistance in our operation against Iran. He’s either told countries that didn’t want to offer assistance that he didn’t need them anyway, or others that have (à la an aircraft carrier from the UK) that they’re too late. He shouldn’t be surprised that his 15 March “demand” that other countries participate in policing the Strait of Hormuz was met with a lukewarm response, with most countries responding that they might be willing to help once conditions improve. Translation – you got yourself into this mess, find your way out.

There’s an existing coalition, however, that should already be engaged in securing safe passage through strait: Combined Task Force-152. CTF-152 is a part of the Combined Maritime Forces, an international naval organization comprising 31 nations established within United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) in 2002 that comprises naval forces within and outside of the Middle East (such as the UK and Australia) with a mandate to counter piracy and terrorism in the region, from the Horn of Africa to Indian Ocean. One of CTF-152’s missions is maritime security operations within the Persian Gulf (Arabian Gulf for those stationed at NAVCENT – don’t want to anger our Arab partners), specifically focusing on illicit, non-state actors. This has also come to mean Iranian sponsored actors that might have been harassing commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.

Leadership of the CTF rotates every three to twelve months, with current leadership residing with the Qatar Emiri Naval Forces since September 2025. With Persian Gulf security lying directly in this CTF’s wheelhouse, one might wonder why either Trump didn’t mention this group during his recent call for assistance or Qatar didn’t roger up a naval vessel or two. Perhaps national interest trumps coalition missions.

Monday 2 March 2026

Why are we doing this now?

The United States’ and Israel’s recent bombardments on Iran have continued the degradation of Iran’s defense establishment since June. Ostensibly, the reason given for the most recent operation was Iran’s refusal to renounce its nuclear program and its burgeoning ballistic missile program. This contradicts President Trump’s statement in June, “Iran’s key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated,” and a May 2025 assessment from the Defense Intelligence Agency that stated Iran could develop a long-range missile capable of reaching the continental U.S. by 2035 if it chose to pursue it.

Then there are the protesters. President Trump threatened the Iranian regime in January if it attacked its protestors. More recently he has encouraged them to rise up and “…take control take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.” He contradicted himself yesterday when he said he could also see a situation where the final end state in Iran was one like Venezuela, leaving the existing power structure in place. While this would prevent the chaos seen in Iraq after the abrogation of the Ba’ath party in Iraq, Iran is not Venezuela. Venezuela has nothing like the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps or its Basij militia, both stronger and more entrenched than anything in Venezuela.

All this leads one to ask – what was the existential threat that drove the United States and Israel to attack Iran right now? What intelligence does either country have that made force more desirable than diplomacy? There’s been no debate in Congress and our aims are contradictory, so why did we do it? Is there some grand strategy that we don’t know about or is the United States simply moving from one bully to the next, at least the bullies we can beat. Hopefully this operation is completed before we run out of munitions.

Thursday 29 January 2026

What’s our next step with Iran?

With the protests waning, the existing Iranian regime has shown that it’s not going anywhere, and it still has the authority to handle dissent as it sees fit, despite threats from President trump. If one believes the reports from various human rights groups, the deaths have been in the thousands. Additionally, earlier this week the leaders of the KSA and the UAE said that they will not allow the use of their territory or airspace against attacks in Iran, preferring their own safety and stability to continuing the pursuit of regime change in Iran. While Iran suffered severe damage to its missile and air defense capabilities after the June attacks by the US and Israel, it still contains a vast arsenal of missiles capable of striking US assets and allies in the region. While the US has other sources of strike capability, to include other regional allies, the Abraham Lincoln CSG, and Diego Garcia, perhaps it’s time to question the existing US strategy vis-à-vis Iran when two of our closest regional allies won’t support an attack. This assumes we have a strategy.

Thursday 15 January 2026

It’s Not 1979

The recent protests in Iran have sparked the idea that the country is on the cusp of regime change, especially with President Trump’s promises of help being on the way. There is a tendency for people to think that this time things are different, and in this case, they are…but only from 1979. The revolution in 1979 was years in coming, based on a dissatisfaction with the Shah and his policies, and the aligning influencse of the bazaaris, clergy, and civil society. This, coupled with military defections and a leader that was unwilling to do whatever was necessary to destroy this witch’s brew, brought about the fall of the monarchy.

While there has been a brewing dissatisfaction with the cultural and economic policies of the current regime, the other areas do not align. The bizaaris do not carry the same weight as in 1979. They are also so ingrained with elements of the current regime, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), that in the short run (and possibly the long run) they would benefit more from stabilization than revolution.

Speaking of the IRGC, they have benefited so much from sanctions-avoidance operations with the other elites that there is little chance of this vanguard of the Islamic Republic ever changing allegiance. While President Trump may make good on his threats of lobbing a few more missiles into Iran, there is little chance of making a change without boots on the ground…and there’s no chance of that happening, especially with the current focus on the Western Hemisphere.

Living in Puerto Rico and having babysat that closed base for a year while I was in the US Navy, I can say that base will never open again. But that’s a discussion for another time.

Wednesday 7 January 2026

A Dangerous Precedent on the High Seas

The United States’ capture of the tanker Marinera raises troubling questions about power, precedent, and the erosion of international norms. While Washington frames the seizure as a matter of security or law enforcement, the optics tell a different story: a superpower unilaterally asserting control over global shipping lanes with minimal transparency and limited accountability.

While there’s risk in changing what is normally a multilateral/multinational process into a unilateral one, to me the bigger risk is setting the precedent of seizing another nation’s flagged vessel without proper provocation. What’s to stop Russia and China from doing the same to one of our vessels or an ally’s vessel under the same precedent. There’s also the danger of executing such a seizure with the warships from the nation under which the vessel is flagged, no matter how spurious, in the general vicinity. Wars have been started by such haphazard operations.

While our opening moves against Venezuela have suffered few negative consequences, we need to be careful and weigh the risks even more as our potential adversaries start using ideas from our playbook.

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